

Causal Exclusion and Ontic Vagueness

Abstract: The Causal Exclusion Problem has been raised in many domains, including in the metaphysics of macroscopic objects. There, the question is whether macroscopic entities are a part of non-redundant causal explanations. If there is a complete explanation of macroscopic effects in terms of the microscopic entities that compose macroscopic objects, then the efficacy of the macroscopic will be threatened with exclusion. In response, I argue that we can avoid the exclusion problem if we accept ontic vagueness about macroscopic objects. It will be indeterminate which set of microscopic entities compose them, so information about microscopic entities will be insufficient to provide a complete explanation of certain properties of macroscopic objects. After outlining this solution, I consider five objections that challenges how this is a solution, what it requires, how it relates to other solutions, and its scope as a solution.