

## Constitution and Exclusion: The Limits of Sharing

**Abstract:** Non-reductive physicalists in the philosophy of mind maintain that mental and physical properties are distinct; however, the causal exclusion problem threatens the apparent efficacy of mental properties. One strategy for answering this problem is to advert to the relationship between the mental and the physical. If mental and physical properties are related closely enough (while still being distinct), then perhaps the overdetermination that results is not problematic. Whether or not this strategy succeeds depends on exactly what the relationship is between mental and physical properties, and whether the relation that obtains has the resources generally to answer the exclusion problem. Here, I evaluate the idea that constituted items are not causally excluded by that which constitutes them, and I consider whether the mental actually is constituted by the physical. Both of these claims have proponents, but both are controversial. I argue that constituted items avoid exclusion by sharing in the efficacy of that which constitutes them. With this solution, the worry resurfaces that constituted items lack distinctive efficacy. I show how they can avoid epiphenomenalism by having effects in virtue of their non-derivative properties, regardless of whether or not these properties are shared. I then show how these ideas would work out if the mental were constituted, and I consider the biggest objections to thinking that mental properties are constituted. Ultimately, I defend the claim that the mental is constituted and able to cause qua mental in virtue of its content.